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I RIVATE grain exporters have notified the United
States Department of Agriculture (USDA) of their
intentions to sell more than 10 million tons of grain to
the Russians in the current marketing year. The sales
include 177million bushels of corn, 154 millionbushels
of wheat, and 50.5 million bushels of barley.’ They
constitute about 3, 7, and 13 percent, respectively, of
the prospective corn, wheat, and barley crops and are
equivalent to 13, 18, and 84 percent, respectively, of
our average annual exports of these crops to all for-
eign purchasers for the past five years.
The grain sales to Russia this year are for cash.
They carry neither a Government price subsidy nor a
Government credit arrangement. Payments for the
shipments will be made with funds which can be
used immediately to purchase goods and services from
abroad.
This is in contrast to the 1972 sales which involved
substantial Government subsidies. The U.S. Govern-
ment at that time maintained a subsidy on all wheat
sold in foreign markets. The subsidy kept the interna-
tional price for U.S. wheat at a lower level than the
domestic price. These subsidies were a holdover from
the old farm programs which were designed to reduce
the domestic grain supply and increase domestic grain
prices. In addition to the price subsidies, the Russians
received a subsidized credit of $750 million that was
made available over a three-year period for purchas-
ing the grain.
This year, however, no export subsidies on wheat
are available and no subsidized credit is granted to
the purchaser. Consequently, most of the basic ceo-
nomic arguments against the 1972 transactions are
missing.
Nevertheless, the recent sales to Russia, like the
earlier sales, have received considerable criticism.
Some analysts have argued that the exports will con-
tribute to higher food prices and to inflation,2 The
rising prices of grain and soybeans during reccnt
weeks are pointed to as evidence of the inflationary
effects of the sales. Higher grain and soybean prices
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0 Walt Street Journal, July 24, 1975.
2For examples of such views, see “Russia Feeds U.S. Infla-
tion,” Business Week, August 11, 1975, pp. 14-15; “Prices: A
Rude Surprise,” Time Magazine, August 4, 1975, p. 59; and
Robert FL Grant, “Mr. Butz and the Grain Sales to Russia,”
The Wall Street Journal, July 28, 1975.
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contribute to higher meat and poultry prices which,
in turn, are believed to spill over into higher prices
for industrial raw materials. Hence, restrictions on
grain exports have been proposed in order to halt this
asserted inflationary impact.
Lcassc Issue is Free im.erne.twntn. leads
In the controversy over the entry of Russia into the
domestic grain market, one major point has been
largely overlooked. Restrictions on grain exports to the
Russians will not prevent domestic grain prices from
rising unless restrictions are placed on all grain ex-
ports. If, for example, the Russians purchased grain
exclusively from Canada, prices there and in other
world trading centers would rise and U.S. grain deal-
ers would have the incentive to sell in those markets.
Grain markets are international and prices in these
markets reflect international supply and demand con-
ditions. Grain will flow to those locations where the
price is highest so long as the price differential ex-
ceeds transportation costs. Thus, as long as the United
States ships grain freely to any other nation, sales to
Russia by U.S. dealers will have no more of an impact
on domestic grain prices than the same amount of
sales by the Canadian Grain Commission or by Aus-
tralian dealers. Consequently, preventing a rise in
domestic grain prices involves the imposition of com-
prehensive controls on grain exports to all nations.
tatai. t~flofl (.]a.straA~9tiers Sheri~liun‘nnse•ei
Comprehensive export controls could be used in the
short run to limit the quantity of grain exports, reduce
domestic grain prices, and raise world grain prices.
The Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries
(OPEC) is an example of an action where a minimum
price has been set on petroleum exports. This has
led to the accumulation of a surplus of oil in member
countries since the rest of the world has not been
willing to purchase all the oil produced by the cartel
at the prevailing fixed prices. The effect on the quan-
tity and price of goods exported is the same whether
the action is initiated by export controls or by artificial
price supports.
Some nations, by imposing such controls, are able
to increase their wealth since in the short run the
gains from higher prices more than offset the decline
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in the quantity of their exports. The OPEC members
have received more foreign exchange for a smaller
amount of exported oil than formerly.
It does not appear that American wheat farmers are
in the same position as OPEC. While it may be true
that total world grain consumption does not fall
~harply in responseto higher prices, the United States
faces strong competition from other grain producing
nations. If we were to limit, through export controls,
the amount of grain we make available in the world
market; the effect would certainly be a somewhat
higher world price than otherwise would be the case,
since the United States supplies a major portion of the
world’s grain exports. But our restrictions would cause
other grain producing countries to increase their ex-
ports. Our competitors, instead of American grain
farmers, would surely gain. Small wonder, then, that
grain farmers are objecting vociferously to proposals
to restrict grain exports — domestic grain prices will
almost certainlybe lower than world grain prices.
Historically, popular and political demands for in-
ternational trade restrictions generally have been for
limitations on imports, through the imposition of either
tariffs or quotas. These restrictions have penalized
consumers who have been forced to pay higher prices
for protected goods in order to benefit producers who
could not compete effectively in a free market. In
contrast, export restrictions initially hurt producers by
depriving them of access to free world markets, and
help consumers by increasing the domestic supply.
However, over the longer run it is not simply a case of
helping one group at the expense of another. Ac-
cepted economic theory implies that, in general, trade
restrictions make this country as well as the entire
world less well off.
~1fFree lead.~ Jill
Despite some occasional short-run gains from in-
ternational trade restrictions, the classical view of in-
ternational exchange remains persuasive. In 1776
Adam Smith outlined a system of free trade among
nations with arguments which are still held as valid
by most economic analysts.’ He pointed to the gains
from the specialization of labor and trade in a small
community. Through such specialization and exchange
of goods and services the total volume of real product
is increased and the costs of goods and services are
lower than if each person attempted to be self-
sufficient.
‘Adam Smith, The Wealth of Nations (New York: The Mod-
em Library, 1937), pp.3-4.
Smith postulated that the gains accruing from the
specialization of labor and other resources in a local
economy are not basically different from those acrni-
ing from the specialization of resource use and ex-
change among nations.4 He contended that the bene-
fits stem directly from imports rather than from
exports. Gains accrue because the imported commodi-
ties can be acquired through trade at a lower cost
than similar or substitutable commodities can be pro-
duced domestically.
The mutual gains from trade can be demonstrated
with a simple example using only two countries and
two goods. Suppose we consider some hypothetical
cost of production figures for the United States and






Product lJni’ed States Germany
Wheat, per bushel $2.50 DM 5
Wino, pc barrel $5.00 DM 5
In the I.’nned States, we must devote to the pro-
duction of every barrel of wine resources which could
otherwise produce two bushels of wheat, while West
Germany gives up only one bushel per barrel of wine.
Alternatively, we can say that the United States gets
two bushels of wheat for every barrel of wine we
give up in production, while West Germany gets
only one. Clearly, the U.S. is a more efficient (that is,
lower cost) producer of wheat, and West Germany is
a more efficient producer of wine.
Suppose with an exchange rate of 1.5 Deutschmarks
per dollar, we decide to export 100 bushels of wheat
for which we give up potential production of 50 bar-
rels of wine. In order to get the $250 to pay for the
wheat, West Germany gives us DM 375 (1.5 x $250)
which we in turn can use to buy 75 barrels of wine,
surely an improvement over the 50we gave up. Notice
also that Germany’s DM 375, which purchased 100
bushels of wheat in the United States, would have
yielded only 75 bushels of domestically produced
wheat.
This example shows that countries engaging in trade
are able to get more goods and services from their
endowments of resources than they could by using
those resources to produce solely for their own con-
sumption. Each is encouraged to expand the produc-
tion of those goods which it produces more efficiently
and to trade them for goods which others can produce
~Ibid,p. 424.
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at lower cost. Conversely, any restriction which turns
a country back toward greater self-sufficiency attains
it at the cost of getting less from its resources — that
is, a lower standard of living.
Ihe (1555 5! iI.ih:flrt
Considering the nation as a whole, what might we
expect to result from the imposition of restrictions on
the amount of grain exported? Given an inelastic
demand for grain, a small decline in U.S. grain ex-
ports could cause a relatively large increase in the
world price of grain in the short run. Total receipts
derived from grain exports would then be greater than
in the absence of export restrictions. Depending on
the extent to which U.S. farmers participate in the
higher returns from the world grain market, both
farmers and consumers could gain relative to the free
market solution. On the other hand, if the world price
of grain did not rise sufficiently to offset the reduced
volume of grain exports (that is, if demand for grain
is elastic), total receipts derived from these sales
would be less than without the grain export limita-
tions. The dollar price of foreign currency would then
be higher, resulting in higher prices paid for the for-
eign goods and services we import. In this case the
farmer is obviously worse off and the consumer is
either better or worse off, depending on one’s pur-
chases of domestic food relative to imported goods
and services. So even immediately, the restrictions
which lead to lower domestic grain prices might not
provide an unmixed blessing for American consumers.
In the longer run, however, the effects of export
restrictions are more drastic (and we have learned
how difficult it is to escape from “temporary” gov-
ernment policies, once they are established). Grain
farmers, finding that they are not allowed to garner
the profits which they would receive from free trade
as a result of their superior efficiency as compared to
their foreign competitors, will reduce grain produc-
tion and turn to alternative forms of employment. In
short, resources which were previously used to pro-
duce goods which we could sell to other countries in
exchange for commodities which they produce more
cheaply are now used to produce those commodities
for ourselves — at a higher cost.
The belief that inflationary pressures arise from the
unrestricted export of grain stems from a basic con-
fusion between the forces which cause changes in
relative prices and those which affect the general
price level. It is quite true that an increase in foreign
demand, if it is allowed to be effective, would raise
the price of grain and grain-related products. It is not
true, however, that this effect would spill over to
higher prices for other goods. The increased demand
for dollars to buy the grain would make imported
goods and services less costly to Americans — if not
now, then at some time in the future. This, in turn,
would exert a downward pressure on the prices of
domestic goods which compete with imports. Further,
the higher price of dollars to foreigners would induce
them to buy fewer American goods, leaving more
available for domestic consumption and making them
cheaper to us.
On the other hand, a rise in the price level (that
is, a rise in the average of prices of all goods)
occurs when we have more money to spend on an
unchanged stock of goods and services or if we were
to have the same amount of money to spend on a
smaller quantity. This would certainly occur if we
were to give our grain away, receiving nothing in
return. Since this is not the question in the recent
grain sales,there is no reason to expect that allowing
farmers to sell their output as profitably as they can
will contribute to inflation.
It is far more likely that a higher price level will
follow from a long-run policy of export restriction on
farm products. The resultant shift of resources out of
agriculture into other uses implies that we will have
fewer of all goods and services than we could other-
wise have. Without reduced money supply growth
and with a smaller commodity bundle available for
domestic purchase, aggravated inflation is to be
expected.
Export controls on grain shipments to Russia have
been proposed. It is contended that such exports lead
to higher food prices and further inflation. Restrictions
on exports to Russia, however, will not prevent do-
mestic grain prices from rising unless comprehensive
controls are placed on all grain exports.
Comprehensive export controls have appeal in the
short run since they tend to restrict current domestic
food prices. In the longer rnn the effects of export
controls are always harmful. They result in a decline
in the world value of the dollar, an increase in the
price of imported goods, less output from our pro-
ductive resources, a higher average price level, and
a lower standard of living.
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